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Operations support as considered here is the
infrastructure of people, procedures, facili-
ties and systems that provide NASA with
the capability to conduct space missions.
This infrastructure involves most of the
Centers but is concentrated principally at
the Johnson Space Center, the Kennedy
Space Center, the Goddard Space Flight
Center, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.
It includes mission training and planning,
launch and recovery, mission control, track-
ing, communications, data retrieval and
data processing.
Operations support of NASA's space
flight systems during the 1960s and the
1970s was associated with operations char-
acterized as Research and Development.
Flight programs were a single flight of
limited duration or a series of flights to ob-
tain specific data or to demonstrate an oper-
ational capability. This required operational
support systems to be reactive and respon-
sive to relatively short duration programs.
In the past ten years, this has continued
with some notable exceptions. With ad-
vances in space and data technologies, the
demonstrated capabilities and advantages of
space operations and the increased cost and
complexity of space systems has led to longer
duration and repetitive flight programs. Sys-
tems engineering of operational support sys-
tems must accommodate this evolution and
the increasing operational nature of NASA.
The need for systems engineering is criti-
cal to NASA in its preparations for conduct-
ing operations in the late 1990s and into the
next decade. The planning and implementa-
tion of the operational support systems for
this era are under way. Proper systems
engineering is vital to the development of
each new system, as well as to a "total sys-
tems engineering" of the functionality and
interfaces of the entire operational system.
Implementation, integration and transition
of these major changes to the Agency's oper-
ational capacity require significant manage-
ment attention. To assure NASA's future in
research, development and operations, this
system must be implemented successfully
and designed to minimize NASA's operation-
al costs.
TOTAL SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
The need for incorporation of systems engi-
neering concepts and discipline is much
broader for operations support systems than
the hardware and software systems for
which it is normally considered. As noted,
operations support is an infrastructure of
people, procedures, facilities and systems.
Although systems engineering is routinely
applied to each new system, the major prob-
lems often occur between systems and
frequently among people, procedures and fa-
cilities. A disciplined systems engineering
approach formulating each of these elements
in the establishment of the "system" cannot
be overemphasized. NASA has learned many
times that good system contractors do not
necessarily nurture good operational person-
nel and technicians nor do they necessarily
develop usable maintenance procedures. Ex-
perience has also shown that facilities not
adequately analyzed in conjunction with the
planned utilization of the facilities require
constant modification to meet operational
needs. In considering support capability,
each of the infrastructure elements requires
analysis and carefully managed selection
and attention.
An organizational tier of system analysis
from the whole to each element can be ap-
plied in a macro sense to assure consider-
ation of both technical and nontechnical
systems. A macro analysis of the system
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involves many considerations; two nontech-
nical areas that have often caused problems
are inadequately skilled personnel and un-
derdesigned facilities.
The nature of operations support requires
a spectrum of talents and skill levels. Most
newly developed systems have not properly
analyzed the experience and skill mix need-
ed nor the number of personnel required,
which varies from skilled flight controllers to
maintenance and repair technicians. Too of-
ten a process to analyze the system operation
and system maintenance and repair require-
ments is not properly developed in advance,
resulting in an operations team that is un-
dersized and underskilled.
A second issue is simply undersizing
facilities. While managers operate on the
"nature abhors a vacuum" principle and
insist that each square foot of a new facility
needs clear functional definition, too often
new facilities are found to be inadequately
sized even before they are put into operation.
This is particularly true with new operation-
al systems. Facilities should be designed to
accommodate the unforeseen. Quite often the
unforeseen is a result of an incomplete
analysis of the operational and system
requirements prior to facility design, but
also new requirements will emerge. A contri-
buting difficulty is NASA's facility approval
process, which is instituted before a reliable
utilization analysis is available. It is prudent
to provide capacity for some growth to ac-
commodate new requirements.
Another nontechnical factor that is of
increasing importance to NASA is life cycle
costing (LCC). NASA has not traditionally
incorporated LCC as a critical selection, de-
sign or engineering process. The elements
critical to LCC have all been managed and
considered, but an LCC process has not been
established within NASA or by NASA's con-
tractors as a routine process. LCC was used
as a contract selection factor by NASA for
the first time in 1988 with the selection of
the second Tracking and Data Relay Satel-
lite System (TDRSS) Ground Terminal. It is
rare that a contractor has an established
technique to trade and iterate design cost
against operations costs. LCC needs to be a
driving discipline to assure that the costs of
operating the increasingly more sophisticat-
ed flight systems can be controlled. The
flight systems of today are projected for 15-
20 years of operation. This demands that the
operational support systems be analyzed and
designed to minimize LCC, or the cost of op-
erations will increasingly erode NASA's re-
sources for new development capacity.
NASA and its contractors should establish
more sophisticated models of development,
operations and maintenance costs that will
provide more reliable data for conducting
operations cost trades against alternative
system designs.
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SYSTEMS
Systems engineering for operational support
systems follows the traditional disciplines
applied to the development of major flight
systems. Operational support requirements
need to be translated into performance pa-
rameters and configurations through multi-
ple iterations to optimize system design. The
purview of systems engineering includes
requirements definitions and verification,
system analysis and design, integration
planning, requirements control, configura-
tion control and testing.
While similar to the design and develop-
ment of major flight systems, the emphasis
of the systems engineer for operational sup-
port systems is generally to provide generic
support to an aggregate of flight programs
and the increasing necessity to provide sys-
tems with extended operational usefulness.
This operational longevity can be attained
by systems capable of accommodating
change while continuing to provide service.
The Deep Space Network operated by Jet
Propulsion Laboratory and the Goddard
Space Flight Network are excellent exam-
ples of major systems that have provided
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space flight program support with tracking
and data retrieval service for 30 years, all of
the while undergoing changes to provide
support for increasingly complex missions.
In addition to providing generic support
to many users, a vital characteristic of sup-
port systems is operability. The focus in the
vehicle development community is principal-
ly directed toward designing a system that
optimizes performance; the operations com-
munity's focus is directed more toward an ef-
fective and efficient operation of the system.
Operability emphasizes ease of operation,
resistance to system problems and failures,
maintainability, reparability, simplicity, ef-
ficiency, capacity for growth and modifica-
tion, and accommodation of users.
These two features, multiple program
support and system operability, are key to
assuring the proper systems engineering of
operations support systems. They are
historically the most difficult to sustain as
cost and schedule pressures frequently tend
to compromise the system's range of utility
and operability.
REQUIREMENTS, EVALUATION,
VERIFICATION AND CONTROL
Operations systems development is general-
ly driven by new, expanded or improved
support service required by new flight pro-
grams or expanded program objectives. The
systems engineer needs to challenge user
requirements to assure the "real" needs are
not sacrificed at the expense of low priority,
highly demanding requirements. Occasion-
ally, requirements are driven by the fact
that new technology is available and not
that it is essential (or even desirable) for
effective operation. The systems engineer
must consider the broad base of program
users and not provide a narrow focus of
support that overly complicates or ignores
operations of the aggregate of users.
While sharply defining real needs, it is
equally critical to consider the potential to
provide for future capacity. In the informa-
tion age, the computer (including software),
communications, and electronics industries
have developed new technologies and capa-
bilities often before a flight program's sup-
port requirements are established. The
incorporation of these new services needs
careful examination and scrutiny; when
these new services clearly enable future or
expanded programs, however, the operation-
al community should provide them to
enhance future operations. An example of
capability beyond defined need was clearly
incorporated in the TDRSS program in 1975.
The TDRSS provides capacity and data rates
that will meet the requirements of the 1990s
and well into the next century. It has also
enhanced flight control concepts by greatly
increasing the capability to access and con-
trol spacecraft. If phasing in of added capa-
bilities can be accommodated, it will permit
smoothing of resources and help the budget-
ing process.
Another important consideration of the
systems engineer in the evaluation of sup-
port requirements is the impact these
services will impose on the user. The goal is
always to limit the interface restrictions
imposed on the user program. Two of NASA's
major operating systems have caused major
constraints in their use. The Shuttle Pro-
gram has imposed major safety and integra-
tion complications on deployed payloads and
the TDRSS program has imposed scheduling
and radio frequency interface constraints
that have been restrictive to some users.
Some of these constraints with both the
Shuttle and the TDRSS were intrinsic to
their operational concepts, but some were
avoidable, had operability and utilization
been more completely evaluated.
When developing systems such as the
Shuttle and the TDRSS that represent a
major departure in operating concepts and
expansion of the operational envelope, the
systems engineer needs to broaden analysis
to the entire mission or spectrum of missions
to better define and limit the major compli-
cations to system operations and utilization.
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NASA's experience with both of these pro-
grams has clearly indicated much more ef-
fort is required to operationally understand
the implications of their use. This experience
should be understood and applied in the de-
velopment of the Space Station, the Earth
Observation System, and their associated
support systems in consideration of their
broad utilization objectives.
Requirements verification and control is
generally practiced with all new develop-
ments, but control can be difficult to sustain
throughout an extended development of an
operational support system and its oper-
ational life. Unfortunately, the nature of
flight programs is to evolve operational sup-
port requirements and occasionally to trans-
fer capabilities planned for the flight system
as requirements to the ground support sys-
tems. Careful monitoring and control of
these requirements is essential, particularly
in the development of software support sys-
tems. Requirement changes will constantly
occur, however, and an efficient process to
identify, approve and control requirements is
vital. Clear and precise interface definition
is necessary to enable this control. A detailed
knowledge of the flight programs that intend
to use the support system, as well as an un-
derstanding of other related support systems
(operational support systems rarely provide
the total functional support services), is re-
quired for effective requirements control by
the systems engineer. Interface definition
and control are essential to maintaining
requirements control.
and expensive to develop. Similarly, less
expensive hardware solutions may be possi-
ble when the full range of software abilities
is considered. (The designer must always
bear in mind, however, the probable need for
system expansion, which may make the
selection of a more complex hardware ele-
ment the prudent choice since software modi-
fications are generally less costly than
computer replacement.) This analysis of
system architecture may involve the estima-
tion of size, complexity and structure of the
software needed for a series of mainframe
computers.
Management and the systems engineer
must realize the definition, design and
implementation of major software packages
require the same systems management
disciplines and controls as do hardware
components. Because software code can be
easily erased or changed, it does not follow
that changes should be considered any more
lightly than they are for hardware. The
flexibility associated with software is its
greatest asset, but if not well managed and
controlled, it becomes its greatest problem.
Although software design has made aston-
ishing progress over the years, software
development remains a significant problem
to most major systems. The inability of
management to accurately predict software
costs, delivery schedules and performance
has consistently been a severe problem in the
development of major operational systems.
LONG-RANGE REQUIREMENTS
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND SOFTWARE
DESIGN
For those operational systems that contain
standard computers and specialized soft-
ware, which are a majority of the ground
systems, a special subset of systems engi-
neering must be performed to obtain the op-
timum hardware and software combination.
The selection of the wrong hardware may
result in software needs that are difficult
An area often inadequately considered in
the design of a support system is its capacity
for future modification and upgrade as new
technology becomes available and as re-
quirements change over time. Many systems
must continue to provide services while
undergoing these modifications. Proper con-
sideration for redundancy and capacity can
greatly alleviate future expense and compli-
cations. Making assumptions regarding
future support requirements can lead to a
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system design that reasonably accommo-
dates alternative future growth require-
ments. Designs that fail to gracefully accom-
modate change are limited and will lead to a
dead end.
While the Deep Space Network and the
Goddard Space Flight Network have effec-
tively accommodated change, the initial
design of the TDRSS ground station failedto
properly consider the long-term need to mod-
ernize and upgrade. This required extensive
redesign and change at significant cost. A
focus on the current needs may result in
limited system utility, and pressures to
implement the least cost system may con-
strain future expansion and ultimately, be
the leastcosteffective.
The development of new features or major
changes to operating systems is frequently
implemented with new contractors.General-
ly,ifNASA and the systems engineer did not
specificallyassure that the original contrac-
tor provided adequate hooks, the new con-
tractor'simplementation willbe difficultand
costly.The term "transition phase" is ap-
plied by NASA to the period when an online
system is undergoing change while continu-
ing toprovide support services.This isa deli-
cate and challenging problem to the systems
engineer and criticalin the selection of an
appropriate design. Itisimportant that tran-
sition be planned in conjunction with the
design process and not after the design is
established.
In considering long-range requirements
for operational systems, the type of system,
the importance of support, and accessibility
are major factors. These factors were central
to NASA's decision and ability to sustain the
Deep Space Network (DSN) and the Goddard
Space Tracking Network over their extended
lifetimes while undergoing numerous modi-
fications and changes. The continuous avail-
ability of these sites has been possible
because of the redundancy within each
ground station, a configuration of multiple
sites (redundancy among the ground sta-
tions), and their accessibility. The recent
major rebuilding of the 240-ft. DSN antenna
reflectors prior to the Uranus Encounter was
feasible because each antenna was sequen-
tially modified, and alternate antenna
systems were available at each DSN location
to provide continuous tracking support.
Redundancy within the systemwprovided
because of the critical nature of tracking and
communications support--and ground sta-
tion accessibility have been critical to
NASA's ability to continuously operate these
networks while modernizing their capabil-
ities.
When considering system changes, space-
based operational support systems present a
different challenge. Two major factors influ-
ence the consideration to change--accessi-
bility and cost. Cost is directly related to the
lack of direct access. Accessibility is difficult
at best and impractical for most. The Hubble
Space Telescope is accessible at great
expense by using the Shuttle but the TDRSS
satellites are presently inaccessible. The
systems engineering of space-born support
systems must consider the criticality of the
service to be provided, the longevity of the
service (providing adequate redundancy and
projected service requirements), and the lack
of ready access to the system. Satellites can
of course be replaced by an upgraded satel-
lite; systems that use multiple satellites at
multiple locations, however, such as TDRSS,
require identical satellite configurations to
provide orbital coverage as an effective oper-
ational system. Spacecraft replacements are
normally planned to sustain the system
through its projected life with no ground in-
terface and no service changes to the system.
When new services become necessary,
they are expensive and require an extended
period to implement. A space-based system
that consists of several satellites, such as
TDRSS, requires a change to the services of
each satellite in orbit to provide an effective
orbital service to the user. This is consistent
with the practice of upgrading all ground
station locations to the same service configu-
ration; the accessibility makes the upgrade
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of space systems more costly and requires a
much longer time.
NASA is now planning to modify the
TDRSS with a higher data rate KA band
service. The system and budget planning for
this upgrade was begun in earnest in about
1985, and it is anticipated the satellite fleet
will not be in orbit until early in the next
century, a 15- to 20-year period. The TDRSS
will have been operating for 20 years or more
by that time. A similar projection will mean
the replacement system, Advanced TDRSS,
will likely be operating to the year 2020 and
perhaps beyond. It is clear this system will
be as challenging as the original, with new
problems replacing those resolved with
TDRSS. The transition of replacing the
TDRSS systems presents a significant new
challenge not faced with initiating the origi-
nal service. Providing systems engineering
for the Advanced TDRSS to remain viable 20
to 30 years in the future will tax any man-
ager. Systems can no longer be replaced
frequently or modified to meet individual
program desires. Careful and complete sys-
tem analysis and forward-thinking engineer-
ing are essential to the establishment of
durable, effective support systems.
ASSURING OPERABILITY
To succeed in developing a support system
that meets the goals of operability--ease of
operation, failure resistance, maintainabil-
ity, efficiency, expandabiIity and accommo-
dation to usersMrequires continuous effort
and emphasis by the systems engineer. An
oversight and regular review from the opera-
tor's viewpoint will contribute to success.
Both the government and the contractors
should provide an operational position with-
in their program management structure that
is responsible for maximizing the system's
operability. Developments that continuously
focus on the ultimate operation are consis-
tently superior in performance and in total
costs.
The need for NASA to be alert to systems
engineering is more prevalent now than ever
before in NASA's history. The implementa-
tion of new operating systems is planned
throughout the 1990s to prepare the agency
for managing the operations of complex, long
duration and extremely high data rate pro-
grams. The quantity of data the agency will
be processing and managing in the later part
of the decade was unimaginable in the 1960s
and the 1970s. This data will be generated
by programs that will be launched in a
period when NASA will already be operating
and supporting a complex array of flight
vehicles. New ground systems, with evolving
capabilities and changing interfaces, will
come into operation almost continuously
throughout this period. The complex nature
of interaction among these systems demands
a visibility and overarching control that can
only be accomplished through a systems
engineering network. Management and co-
ordination of the individual systems is re-
quired to assure total system functionality,
interface definition, requirements control
and the optimization of each system.
NASA has done an excellent job for the
past 30 years in providing an operations
infrastructure that has met the demands of
exploring space. The next 30 years of space
operations are equally exciting but represent
a far greater challenge. The quality of the
systems engineering of the operations
support team is critical to both the success of
the nation's civil space flight programs and
to sustaining a viable operational role with-
in NASA.
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